Let me begin with a consideration of what I believe to be the key challenges facing the ODF. The idea is that this discussion will facilitate a systematic exposition of the risks motivating this letter. In my appraisal, the following are the critical challenges of your organization as things stand right now.
I. Although your detractors have written you off altogether, it appears that the majority of the Oromo people have mixed feelings about you in particular, and the Oromo Democratic Front (ODF) in general. While rightly acknowledging your selfless contributions to the Oromo cause, many seem to harbor some misgivings about the possible motivations underpinning your newest political incarnation. In one of your recent interviews, you sounded uncharacteristically bitter about being expelled from the central committee of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), leading people to suspect that the ODF might have been conceived out of frustration, perhaps even vindictiveness, without a sober analysis and a careful accounting of the consequences. Nonetheless, based on your revealed preferences – your previous heroic service to our nation – the average Oromo might still afford you some benefit of the doubt when it comes to your motivation in engineering the establishment of the ODF. I am one of them.
I think you owe it to yourself, to your dedicated followers within your new organization, and to your forbearing nation to sufficiently justify the birth of the ODF, and to make sure to explain how you – Leenco Lata – one of the founding-fathers of the Oromo Liberation Army, came to the decision to work with the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) once again, renouncing armed-struggle unconditionally. Sorry, the “world has changed, so we have to change accordingly” narration is a tad self-serving. To suggest even remotely that, the world is changing in a manner that oppressed people have limited alternatives, but to work within the parameters prescribed by the tyrannical forces of thestatus quo, is simply empirically inaccurate.
My view is that, given the unfortunate circumstances surrounding Dr. Diimaa’s and your departure from the OLF, persuading people that you are still guided by honorable motivations in your latest political move, remains a unique challenge that must be addressed. How successfully your organization is going to tackle this particular challenge, will very much determine whether or not it will succeed in achieving its objectives.
If I were you, I would anchor the case for ODF’s establishment on the disturbing fact that there is a dearth of substantial Oromo voices in Finfinnee – the Oromo-city-in-name-only political capital of the empire – which has increasingly become the turf of all sorts of reactionary Abyssinian forces, and whose expansion has, for all practical purposes, meant the annihilation of the surrounding Oromo communities, pausing the risk of a permanently occupied Oromo nation literally from the inside out. I think such a rationale would ring true and could gain your organization some audience among our people, who might (for any number of reasons) not wish to openly endorse the “bad-cop” approach pursued by the OLF. It would thus be appropriate for you to make the case that the ODF is stepping in as a “good cop” to endeavor to empower the Oromo, albeit modestly.
II. Making the case that your motivations are honorable is just a start. Even more importantly, you are faced with the challenge of establishing that your move will benefit the Oromo people. This is essentially where the rubber meets the road, constituting the most serious and consequential test of your new organization. The ODF must undertake a learned assessment of what its intended move is going to mean (probabilistically) for the Oromo. This requires an accounting of the potential costs and benefits associated with the step, by way of simulation of all possible scenarios, based on intelligent predictions of the risks and the likely outcomes of each possible course of event. It involves gaming ODF’s possible future activities in a system run by a predictably vicious opponent that enjoys certain inbuilt advantages. I will provide my take on the likely scenarios below, highlighting some of the potential risks associated with your anticipated move, not as a substitute for the real and more substantial analysis that ought to be conducted, but as a rough template or framework of the kind of due-diligence I am calling for in this piece. I will begin by identifying the key players.
The Ethiopian political landscape remains fluid with three major players and several minor actors, with the former clamoring to modulate it to their favor. The major players include advocates of the emerging Oromo nation, with its considerable demographic size and large economic base; the TPLF, which, despite having a very narrow power-base, currently controls the key governmental institutions in the empire and represents the interests of the de facto Republic of Tigray; the historically powerful Amhara elites, who seem to be preoccupied with the herculean task of reconstituting the fading Ethiopia, which has aptly been described as the prison-house of Nations and Nationalities. The minor actors include the representatives of the dozens of the other ethnic groups in the country and certain external actors. The former are essentially outcome-takers, though not necessarily innocent bystanders, with their respective groups’ interests tied more closely to those of one of the major players. The external players, which wield some power in shaping how the political trajectory of the Ethiopian empire evolves, include the Western powers, regimes in the neighboring countries, and increasingly the People’s Republic of China. Owing to the less-judicious and nakedly self-absorbed exercise of its power in the recent past, the influence of the West in shaping the course of events in the Horn of Africa (and elsewhere) might be waning, but it remains potent.
As you must suspect, the TPLF – the incumbent you are seeking to work with – understands very well that the path it has been on, is simply unsustainable and could turn suddenly catastrophic. Notwithstanding the false impression it has been able to create (among the less-informed and/or more-gullible) that it is firmly in control, its various desperate actions suggest otherwise. Even while continually bragging it has wiped out the Oromo Liberation Front, its army has ventured into and occupied the neighboring countries in flagrant violation of international law, and has sustained heavy casualties at times in its obsessive effort to deny the OLF insurgency a strategic base of operation. Domestically, it has created prison-camps to house nationalist Oromos, with the twin objectives of reducing the risk of opposition emanating from those it deems dangerous, and creating strong disincentives for anyone else who might potentially be activated for the Oromo cause. It has instituted subtler measures, such as anointing the ignominious among us as our national representatives, in a twisted goal of breaking our resolve psychologically. Despite these and many other atrocities and dirty tricks by this organization, the Oromo nation is emerging organically over time, indicating that the day of reckoning just might be around the corner.
On the other hand, the TPLF ought to be concerned about certain recent developments in the Amhara political camp as well. The Amhara elites (AEs), after the punishing blow they were dealt during the 2005 national elections, are regrouping, attempting to emerge as a potential threat to the ruling clique, with the ambition of resuming their abruptly interrupted Colonial Assimilation Project (CAP), under the guise of saving Ethiopia from disintegration. Chances are minimal that they would be able to pull this off; nevertheless, it would be a significant political malpractice with catastrophic downsides for the TPLF to grant the AEs any opening in this power play, and here is why.
For the AEs, politics is essentially a zero-sum game where the winner takes all, with dupes engaging in the politics of compromise and give-and-take to achieve win-win solutions. The so-called Ethiopian history is replete with accounts of how the AEs became the dominant group through duplicitous activities, including being used as a conduit by third parties, and annihilating potential competitors to their power. This attitude of winning at all costs is so deeply ingrained in their political tradition that they would rather remain in the political wilderness than settling for anything less than striving to reinstitute their CAP, which they consider to be their manifest destiny. By making the defeat of ethno-nationalism in the country their singular political mission of the day, therefore, the AEs are playing a high-stakes game, unequivocally demonstrating that they want All, or Nothing at All.
With the benefit of this background information, let us review the game from the standpoint of the incumbent. As the player with ‘First Mover’ advantages, the TPLF has a few options (some riskier than others) to advance its objectives. Welcoming the AEs into the fold in order to fight the rising threat coming from the Oromo camp (call this strategy – WAE), would simply be self-destructive (see above), and can readily be ruled out as a feasible option. There is not a rational reason for the TPLF to pursue this dangerous course of action, when it has the *coalition it wants* with the Amharas to fight the Oromo insurgency, without assuming any risk to its power by accommodating the AEs. The informal coalition it has with the Amharas allows it to recruit a significant number of the Amhara youth into the so-called Ethiopian Defense Forces (EDF) – mostly as foot soldiers – in order to suppress the Oromo insurrection, with unexpressed endorsement from the AEs.
Persisting in its current policy of excluding both the AEs and the real representatives of the Oromo people (call this strategy PCP) might be superior to WAE, but is unappealing as well, since that requires taking the current (and rising) level of risk to its power. The regime’s old tricks (e.g. instigating inter/intra ethnic conflicts to divert attention from its suffocating tyranny, and playing the role of a referee before things get out of hand to earn undeserved credits; portraying Eritrea as the “thorn in the Horn” to create a state of constant emergency in the country; antagonizing the otherwise peaceful Ethiopian Muslims to introduce religious animosity in the political discourse; facilitating a schism in the Ethiopian Coptic church to deny the AEs the traditional source of their political strength) have, more or less, run their courses, and will not be sufficient to sustain it in power for much longer. Hence, in order to continue to contain the brewing Oromo revolution, while keeping the AEs at bay, the TPLF needs another political formula.
That is where the armed-struggle-renouncing and Western-powers-pleasing ODF enters the play, as a suitable representative of the Oromo camp (fair enough), and with some remote chance, a possible alternative to the OLF (unthinkable and undesirable), riding to the rescue. Bringing an Oromo organization led by someone of your caliber and stature into the political process (let us call this strategy BRO) could significantly diffuse the unmistakable political tension that has gripped the country, allowing the TPLF some breathing room to recalibrate, and perhaps live to fight another day. That the TPLF (particularly its shrewd former leader) has kept some line of communication with you, is suggestive that it prefers the strategy of engaging Oromo political forces to the alternative scenarios briefly outlined above. To summarize, BRO is the dominant strategy, but PCP is superior to WAE as far as the TPLF is concerned.
Embedded in what appears to be the most-likely scenario about to transpire in the Ethiopian political landscape soon, are some pitfalls for the Oromo people, for which you must have Best Responses – strategies that will yield the most desirable outcomes for the nation you have dedicated your life to serving. Anything less would be an unforgivable negligence of the first order. Here are some of the potential risks (to the Oromo) associated with BRO.
1. The ODF As a Potential TranquilizerFrom its own successful experience, the TPLF knows that there is no force that could stop a population that has been pushed to the limit and properly organized to fight back. The Oromo are fast approaching such a tipping point in their bitter struggle: that we, as a nation, have been pushed to the limit – is well documented and needs no repetition here. Our injury is so deep and still growing, but we have lacked organization(s) that would effectively channel our grievances, giving us a chance to fight back. Thankfully, we are making advances in terms of organization in more recent days. The OLF, after sustaining a very unfortunate self-inflicted wound, appears to have been re-energized enough, pausing a credible threat to the TPLF hegemony. Diaspora Oromos have recognized the necessity of getting organized, and are striking on their own to launch important initiatives and essential Oromo institutions in record time. (History will fondly remember the heroic deeds of a few dedicated individuals responsible for the successful launching of the AFAAN Publications Initiative, the energizing ‘I Am Oromo First’ Public Engagements, the successful ‘Boycott Bedelle Brewery’ social media campaign; and most significantly, the founding of the Oromia Media Network (OMN) and the Oromo Voice Radio (OVR), rallying a scattered people.) The formation of the ODF also constitutes a potential organizational maturity of the Oromo nation, with the caveats noted above.
By accommodating your organization, the TPLF is hoping to soothe the Oromo and delay the inevitable revolt by a people who have endured extreme injustice. Therein lies the major risk to the Oromo of your political re-incarnation as the ODF. Your entry must therefore be conditioned on whether the potential benefit of your much anticipated move outweighs the risks that it might introduce complacency in the Oromo camp, offering a false hope to our people that a political dialogue with the Abyssinians as the primary political strategy will lead to the promised land.
To mitigate this risk, your vision must not be sold to the Oromo as the be-all and end-all, rather as one necessary piece of the puzzle that could empower the Oromo. If you are positioning yourself as a potential replacement to the OLF, you might as well forget about it. However, if your goal is to do all you can to advance the Oromo cause, without being used as a tranquilizer to relieve our collective agony, then we are in business. Your posture in due course will reveal how carefully you have considered this particular potential downside of your imminent “co-operation” with the TPLF.
2. The ODF as a Wedge Issue in the Oromo campThe other major risk associated with BOR is that it may divide the Oromo polity into two warring factions with devastating consequences. As you know, the vocal segment of the Oromo political class has entrenched extreme views about you, with some portraying you as a traitor – a Gobana if you will – and others holding the exact opposite view. The risk is that this spurious issue - if it is not addressed appropriately and adequately by the responsible and learned segment of our population (which includes you) preemptively – could entrap a growing number of Oromo into one or the other faction, potentially driving a damaging wedge among Oromos.
You know the TPLF is gifted at exploiting such issues to weaken its political opponents, and it is fair to assume that it has been engaged in indirect talks with you, not because of some noble desire to resolve the outstanding issues, but in order to (among other goals) divide and weaken the Oromo polity. Rest assured, the incumbent has plans of action ready to be rolled out to fan this potential flame, which could burn us all. I would like to think that you have realizable strategies that could neutralize any such moves by the TPLF.
My strong suggestion is the following: before going in, the policy makers in the ODF need to come up with a sober game plan to avert any such disaster. The key is to identify the animating issues driving the factions, and tackling them directly and preemptively, however trivial and bogus they might be.
3. The risks from within the ODFI have no doubt that most of the members and supporters of the ODF are proud Oromo nationalists who might have grown weary with the uncertain state of the armed-struggle being waged by the OLF. Like you, some of them were even high-profile representatives and/or members of this organization. But, this does not obviate the risk that some might be lurking within the ODF to pursue their personal ambition, even at the expense of the national agenda. You were likely using a euphemism or joking when you stated in a recent interview that you are moving to Shaggar because you are tired of the winters in the land of the Vikings; but it does not surprise me if some were jumping on the ODF ship to escape their less-than-satisfying existence in the West, hoping to rub shoulders with the power brokers in Finfinnee and enjoying the perks that come with it.
I can only hope that your organization has a mechanism in place to screen out and rank individuals based on their commitment levels. What people have done in the past when no one is looking and applauding, should be used as a guidepost to determine who can be entrusted with the responsibilities of your organization, if you mean business.
4. The risks associated with the heightened expectations your imminent entry might be causingIt appears that some Oromos have high hopes that your presence in Shaggar alone is going to make some difference, based on a naive perception that you have the backing of certain western powers, and that it is going to translate into real payoffs for the Oromo. Even if the former is true, it would require suspending basic logic to assume that a favorable external push would lead to unambiguous beneficial outcomes for the Oromo. No amount of exogenous intervention is going to take us any closer to the finishing-line as a people, if we fail to be mobilized and act with the understanding that we hold our destiny in our own hands.
The inexcusably lame attitude among a segment of our population that someone else is going to pay the dues for our freedom, explains why so many are raising their expectations that the ODF’s entry will be advantageous for the Oromo. Such a rose-colored outlook rests on inflated assumptions, carrying with it a severe downside if/when those expectations are not met. Social-scientists have successfully modeled the likely inferior outcomes that occur, where these tendencies prevail. I would thus urge the ODF to lower people’s expectations of the benefits associated with its imminent political move, even while arguing that it will be able to empower the Oromo. This requires a careful balancing act to perform.
To recap, entry is advisable if and only if the minimum expected benefits accruing to our nation tops the maximum possible damage of the engagement. You must have certain assured benefits in hand to justify taking the above cited (and other) risks. Remember the TPLF is pursuing BOR because that is likely its best political strategy at the moment. For your “co-operation” (which I have argued will benefit the incumbent), what is the ODF being offered in exchange? What are the *deliverables* for the Oromo? You have a good hand to play, and it would be a tragedy if you failed to make the most of it. How is your engagement going to bolster the Oromo position? Somehow, you must persuade us that you have conducted the necessary due diligence, and thought through all the possible scenarios and have realizable strategies in case of A, B and C … This will help in convincing the average Oromo that your motivations are indeed upstanding and your pursuits worthy, thereby strengthening your hand and bolstering the chances of a further empowered Oromo nation.
Fortunately, we have our own media just in time, which you could use as a stage to clear the air, so to speak. I hope the people in charge of the newly established OMN and OVR will give you the necessary platforms for in-depth, substantial and frank discussions to illuminate the issues pertaining to your highly anticipated political move. It would only be appropriate that these interviews be conducted by objective and competent persons, who have proven their neutrality and mettle in good and bad times.
Let the real conversation begin!
Malkaa Guutuu
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* Malkaa Guutuu can be reached at malkaa.guutuu@gmail.com.
* Malkaa Guutuu can be reached at malkaa.guutuu@gmail.com.
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